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Abstract  
This paper investigates the effect of terrorism on fiscal policy volatility in developing 
countries. Using both cross-country and panel data analysis for 66 countries from 1970 to 
2012, we find that an increase in the number of terrorist incidents raise the volatility of the 
discretionary component of fiscal policy. In addition, the analysis shows that fiscal volatility is 
positively influenced by the volatility of output growth, the consumer price inflation volatility, 
the degree of fractionalization of both the government and the opposition. The results also 
show that the volatility is higher is countries of small size and lower in more democratic 
countries. Our results are robust to reverse causality, endogeneity bias and the presence of 
various controls. This paper complements and extends the previous literature by providing 
the evidence that terrorism substantially increases the uncertainty surrounding the conduct 
of fiscal policy in developing countries. 
Key words: Fiscal policy, Terrorism, fiscal policy volatility 
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1. Introduction 
In 2013, a total of 9,707 terrorist attacks occurred worldwide, resulting in more than 17,800 
deaths and more than 32,500 injuries (START
1
, 2013). In addition terrorist attacks lead to a 
wide range of economic and social consequences, including the destruction of human and 
physical capital. The consequences of terrorism are particularly severe in developing 
countries which are more vulnerable to external shocks and domestic shocks. While there is a 
long tradition in the economic profession to assess the economic consequences of conflicts, 
terrorism has received little attention. However, the 2001 terrorist attacks triggered a new 
wave of studies aiming to assess the economic cost of terrorism. In this line the early paper of 
Gupta et al (2004) highlights the fiscal consequences of terrorism in low and middle income 
countries. Their findings show that terrorism is associated with lower tax revenues, higher 
government spending on defense and changes in the composition of government spending. 
Recently, Drakos and Konstantinou (2014) have shown that a shock in terrorism risk 
significantly increases the subsequent trajectory of public order and safety spending in 
European countries. However these studies fail to address the effect of terrorist incidents on 
the uncertainty surrounding the conduct of fiscal policy.  
 
In this study, we explore the potential effects of terrorism on the volatility of the discretionary 
component of fiscal policy in developing countries. In fact terrorism attacks raise the 
uncertainty on both local and foreign investments, deteriorate business climate and drive out 
tourists and potential revenues. Since tax revenues are likely to be affected by the level of 
both domestic and foreign investment, terrorism may result in greater fiscal instability. 
Likewise, in response to terrorist attacks, governments increase public spending on homeland 
security. This comes at the expense of fiscal stability because terrorism negatively affects the 
tax base and lowers the efficiency of tax administration. In addition terrorist incidents can 
undermine consumer and investor confidence. This may reduce incentives to spend or invest. 
The uncertainty associated to consumption and investment behavior will result in higher fiscal 
volatility because public spending is positively correlated with growth expectation.  
The contribution of this paper is threefold. (i) We provide empirical evidence of the 
relationship between terrorism and fiscal policy volatility on a panel of developing countries. 
(ii) This article contrasts cross-country and panel data evidence while controlling for a wide 
range of macroeconomic and institutional factors. (iii) We propose an identification strategy 
to deal with the issue of endogeneity and measurement error in addressing the effect of 
terrorism on fiscal policy. We build upon the existing literature on the determinants of 
conflicts in order to provide a source of exogenous variation for terrorist incidents (see 
Miguel et al, 2004; Hsiang, Burke and Miguel, 2014). We argue that terrorism is more likely 
to occur in countries characterized by scarcity of economic resources due to long lasting 
economic shocks and higher initial level of conflict. Specifically, we build our instrument of 
terrorist incidents by multiplying the initial level of terrorism in a specific country by the 
variation in rainfall. Furthermore, we check the robustness of our finding by using three 
different methods. In the first robustness check we use the generated instrument approach 
coined by Lewbel (2012). The method is applied to supplement external instrument and 
improves the efficiency of the IV estimator. In this framework, the identification is achieved 
using heteroskedastic covariance restriction. For the second robustness check, we resort to the 
system-GMM estimator which allows for the use of lagged differences and lagged level of the 
explanatory variables as instruments (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Finally, we take advantage 
                                                          
1
 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. 
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of difference in difference estimator to check for the robustness of our findings. Other 
robustness tests include the use of the number of victims as an alternative interest variable and 
the disaggregation of spending between consumption and investment. 
This paper is policy relevant for several reasons. The study sheds a new light on the 
understanding of the key drivers of fiscal uncertainty. In fact, modelling fiscal volatility is 
important to understand the sources of aggregate fluctuation (Fernando-Villaverde et al, 
2013). In addition, fiscal volatility is reported to have a negative effect on economic activity 
(Woo, 2011). Therefore, understanding the sources of fiscal volatility may help design 
appropriate policies to reduce the vulnerability of countries to shocks. 
Using a sample of 66 developing countries over the period 1970 to 2012, the paper shows that 
terrorism increases fiscal policy volatility in developing countries. Specifically, a one percent 
increase in the number of terrorist incidents induces a rise in fiscal volatility ranging between 
0.21% (cross country analysis) and 0.37% (panel data analysis). 
The structure of the article is as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of the literature. 
Section 3 sets out the methodology used to identify the effect of terrorism on fiscal volatility. 
Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 offers conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
Several studies have assessed the impact of conflict and terrorism on economic activities. 
Addison et al (2002) find that armed conflicts and violence adversely affect financial 
development by undermining the confidence in domestic currency due to the fear of inflation 
and money depreciation. In the same line, armed conflict and violence directs financial 
resources away from productive assets and affect the regulation of the financial system. Using 
a sample of 79 countries, they find that conflicts and violence reduce financial development. 
This can obviously lead to lower growth since financial development is proven to be 
positively correlated with the former. 
Addressing the effect of terrorism on the state of world economy, Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2008) show both theoretically and empirically that terrorism increases uncertainty and 
reduces the expected return to investment. Therefore, higher intensity of terrorist attacks is 
associated with lower net foreign direct investment position. Estimates based on a sample of 
90 countries suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the terrorist risk induces a fall in 
the net foreign investment position of about 5% of GDP. 
Another channel through which terrorism may affect economic activities is via its impact on 
regional and domestic tourism. Drakos and Kutan (2003), in a study covering Greece, Israel, 
Turkey and Italy find that the intensity of terrorist incidents has significant domestic and cross 
country effects on tourism.  
Terrorism also affects international trade by raising the transaction costs and the cost of doing 
business. As shown by Nitsch and Schumacher (2004), doubling the number of terrorist 
incidents may lead to a decrease of bilateral trade by 6%. 
Terrorist threats may also have negative effects on fiscal stance as suggested by Gupta et al 
(2004), Bloomberg et al (2004). Accordingly, terrorism increase government spending at the 
expense of investment and macroeconomic stability. These papers contrast with the traditional 
literature which focuses on the macroeconomic and institutional determinants of the fiscal 
volatility. 
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The literature highlights a variety of factors as potential causes of volatility. This includes 
excessive government spending, high inflation, overvalued exchange rates, political and 
institutional factors. Acemoglu et al (2003) shows that countries with large public sector 
experience higher volatility. In fact as suggested by Gavin and Perotti (1997), the fiscal policy 
response to the business cycle occurs through the supply of credit which translates into higher 
public spending during booms and spending cuts in recession. External shocks can generate 
domestic inflation and act as an important source of fiscal risk. In this line, Bertin-Levecq 
(2002) argues that shocks in the terms of trade can negatively affect fiscal revenues, 
especially in countries suffering from underdeveloped tax system. In addition, the volatility of 
growth can be detrimental for fiscal revenues as it makes the latter less predictable. Such an 
effect can also occurs when the country lacks deep financial system and is unable to smooth 
shocks by issuing debt on domestic or international financial markets (Gavin and Perotti, 
1997; Bertin-Levecq, 2002). 
Woo (2005, 2011) emphasizes the role of political variables as the potential drivers of fiscal 
policy instability. Using a large sample of countries over the period 1960-2000, Woo (2011) 
finds that political instability is positively and significantly associated with fiscal policy 
volatility. In fact political instability can result in swings among different fiscal policies, 
especially if the polarization of social preferences is high (Woo, 2011). Likewise, the paper 
shows that there is a positive relationship between politically motivated assassinations and 
fiscal volatility. Woo (2011) argues that political unrest shorten the horizons of politicians and 
increase the likelihood of short term policies which come at the expense of macroeconomic 
stability. 
According to Acemoglu et al (2003), economic instability is expected to be greater in 
institutionally weak societies. They argued that in institutionally weak societies, there are 
weak constraints on rulers. Therefore, rulers use their political power to redistribute assets and 
income to themselves in the process creating economic turbulence. In addition, when 
institutions are weak, political and economic instability is higher because various groups 
permanently fight to come to power. In the same time, politicians are forced to conduct 
unsustainable policies in order to satisfy various groups and remain in power. 
While several papers have studied the effect of political variables on fiscal policy volatility, 
few papers have addressed the effect of terrorism as a shock and potential source of both 
political and economic instability. The early paper of Gupta et al (2004) shows that terrorism 
negatively and significantly impacts economic activities through changes in the level and 
composition of public spending. These changes come from the increase in defense and 
security spending in response to terrorist attacks. 
In order to combat terrorism, governments increase public spending on homeland security, 
military operation and counter terrorism activities. This can rise fiscal imbalance and threaten 
fiscal consolidation. A direct consequence could be fiscal policy instability since the capacity 
of the government to absorb external shock by increasing expenditure or issuing debt is 
weakened. Likewise, Gupta et al (2004) argue that terrorism affects the fiscal account by 
eroding the tax base, lowering the efficiency of tax administration and changing the 
composition of public spending. In addition, the increase of military expenditure in response 
to terrorist attacks may divert the investments from the accumulation of productive capacities 
and crowd-out spending on social sectors including education and health. However, the 
empirical investigation carried out by Gupta et al (2004) shows that terrorism indeed increases 
defense spending, but this is at the expense of macroeconomic stability rather than at the cost 
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of lower spending in education and health. Therefore increased terrorist incidents can translate 
into fiscal volatility through macroeconomic instability.  
This contrasts with the findings of Bloomberg et al (2004) which suggest that terrorist risk 
leads to an increase of consumption spending and fall in investment. Since tax revenues are 
likely to be affected by the level of both domestic and foreign investment, terrorism may 
result in greater fiscal instability. In the same line, using a panel of European countries over 
the period 1994-2006, Drakos and Konstantiniou (2014) find that terrorist attacks 
significantly increase the subsequent trajectory of public spending on public order and safety.  
However, the magnitude of the effect is small and lasts only one year. 
3. Empirical analysis 
This section revolves around three main parts. First, we describe how terrorism and fiscal 
policy volatility are measured. Second, the econometric model is described. Finally, we 
discuss the identification strategy used in order to uncover the causal effect of terrorism on 
fiscal volatility. 
3.1. Data on Terrorism and fiscal policy volatility 
3.1.1. Terrorism incident dataset 
Terrorism data used in this paper are drawn from the Global Terrorism Database-GTD 
hereafter- which is maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) based at the University of Maryland.
2
 The START uses 
various sources for data collection including media articles, unclassified documents, 
electronic news archives, existing data sets, books and legal documents. The GTD records 
incidents of terrorism from 1970 to 2012 for over 160 countries. The terrorism is defined as 
the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a 
political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.  
In order to be considered as a terrorist incident, the following conditions should be satisfied: 
(1) the incident must be intentional: the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a 
perpetrator. (2) the incident must entail some violence or threat of violence, including 
violence against property or/and against people. (3) The perpetrator of the incident should be 
sub-national actors. Therefore, GTD does not include acts of state terrorism. In addition, the 
action undertaken should be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. It is worth 
mentioning that GTD records both national and transnational terrorism incidents. 
3
 The GDT 
reports, among other, information about the day, month and year of the terrorist incident, the 
duration of the incident, the incident location, the type of attack, the type of weapon used, the 
target and perpetrators (if known), total number of fatalities.  
In this paper, we are only interested in the frequency of terrorist attacks. Therefore, we 
computed the number of terrorist incidents by country and by year. Since our main focus is on 
developing countries, we use a final sample of 66 developing countries covering the period 
                                                          
2
 Data are available free of charge at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
3
 Note that this is a plus compared to ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of 
Terrorism Events) which record only transnational terrorism. ITERATE is an alternative 
source for terrorist attacks. The list of countries is provided in appendix. 
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1970-2012. A brief look at the data suggests that the average number of attacks per country 
over the entire period stands at 6. The minimum number of terrorist incidents is 1 while the 
maximum recorded is 50 (see Table 1). A disaggregation of these statistics by region shows 
that the most affected region is the Middle East and North Africa with 50 terrorist incidents 
on average over the period of study. The less impacted region is Sub-Saharan Africa where 2 
incidents were reported on average (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Terrorism and fiscal policy volatility across regions 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
3.1.2. Measuring fiscal policy volatility 
In order to build the measure of fiscal policy volatility, we focus on government spending. As 
suggested by Woo (2011), government spending is a policy variable that is influenced by 
policy decisions and widely used in the implementation of government policy. Another 
justification often put forward is that unlike government spending, tax revenue and budget 
deficit are outcome of government policies
4
. Moreover cross-country data on government 
spending are more available and less subject to measurement error than tax revenues data. 
There are two ways to measure the volatility of fiscal policy (Woo, 2011; Cevik and Teksoz, 
2014). The naïve approach consist on using the standard deviation of the annual growth rate 
of fiscal spending/tax revenue/primary budget balance, over the period of study. Then, it is 
                                                          
4
 As robustness check, we alternatively use government consumption and government spending on investment. 
We also take into account countries which do not report any incident of terrorism by using log(1+terrorism) 
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worth noting that this method does not isolate the exogenous component of policy changes. 
However as shown by Woo (2011) and Agnello and Souza (2014), it is important to 
distinguish fiscal volatility from adaptability to sudden changes of economic conditions 
because the latter is more likely to stabilize the economy while the former may discourage 
growth. In this paper, we are interested in the discretionary component of fiscal policy that 
doesn’t represent reaction to changes in economic conditions or reflect exogenous changes in 
political preferences. Therefore, following Fatas and Mihov (2003), Woo (2011) and Agnello 
and Souza (2014), we estimate the subsequent model for each of the countries over the entire 
time span: 
                                                                       (1) 
where     is the real general government expenditure,            is the one lag of GDP 
growth,     is a vector of control variables including inflation and inflation squared;       is 
the time trend. The measure of the discretionary fiscal policy volatility is the logarithm of the 
standard deviation of the residuals recovered from equation (1). Descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 1 show that the fiscal policy volatility ranges between a minimum of 0.02 
and a maximum of 8.79 with an average value of 0.30 over the sample period. Likewise, 
consumption expenditures are less volatile than investment expenditures. A more detailed 
picture suggests that the more volatile region is East Europe and Central Asia while the less 
volatile is South Asia. 
3.2. Econometric Model 
This section discusses the empirical strategy which is adopted in order to identify the effect of 
terrorism on the fiscal policy volatility. The economic relationship we are interested in is the 
following: 
                                                            (2) 
In equation (2),      is a set of control variable and      is an unobserved error term. In line 
with the existing literature (see Woo, 2011; Agnello and Souza, 2014; Cevik and Teksoz, 
2014), we use two set of control variables: macroeconomic controls and institutional controls. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (cross country) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Fiscal Volatility 65 0.3069808 1.111271 0.0241606 8.797791 
Volatility of consumption expenditure 65 0.4425122 1.858663 0.024232 14.79205 
Volatility of investment expenditure 65 0.4773917  1.996533 0.0252467 15.97412 
Number of terrorist attacks 65 6.421705 11.52089 1 50.66667 
Number of victims 65  0.1782433  0.3951999 0 2.330331 
Log(GDP growth instability) 65 3.694725 2.365018 0.8934791 18.11915 
Log(inflation instability) 65 1.637238 0.9616074 -.2520737 5.333652 
Trade openness 65 65.65811 31.48994 16.80632 160.1294 
Financial openness 65 0.3386756 0.2170911 0.0626581 1 
Log(population) 65 9.231863 1.40668 6.532918 13.6172 
Democracy 65 1.824248 4.298072 -7.324324 10 
Major government crisis 65 0.1831016 0.2304842 0 0.9583333 
Checks and balances 65 2.869416 1.051101 1 7.514286 
Size of the cabinet 65 21.60354 4.8552 12.08108 31.2973 
Opposition fractionalization 65 0.4541938 0.2144558 0 0.8714285 
Government fractionalization 65 0.1701471 0.1687731 0 0.7326807 
Income inequality 65 44.20599 7.952554 25.6129 65.27795 
 
The first group of controls includes growth volatility, logarithm of inflation volatility, trade 
openness, financial openness, logarithm of population and income inequality. The growth 
volatility is measured as the five years rolling standard deviation of the GDP growth. It is 
included to control for potential effects of macroeconomic shocks on fiscal policy. In fact, the 
government could be forced to adjust the budget in response to sudden change in growth 
prospects. We therefore expect a positive effect of growth volatility on the volatility of fiscal 
policy. Likewise the consumer price inflation volatility is the five years rolling standard 
deviation of the inflation and is included to control for the destabilizing effect of external 
shocks such as terms of trade shocks or a depreciation of the real exchange rate
5
. Because the 
high volatility of inflation increases the uncertainty in the conduct of fiscal policy, we expect 
a positive relationship between these two variables. Trade openness is measured as the sum of 
import and export in percentage of GDP. Following Rodrik (1998) and Woo (2011), we 
expect a positive relationship because greater openness exposes the country to more external 
shocks and greater exposure to external shocks induces important fluctuations in public 
spending. In the same line, financial openness measures the degree of capital account’s 
openness and the extent to which the restrictions on international financial transactions are 
low. The total population enters regression to control for country size effects. As shown by 
Afonso et al (2010), larger country size helps to insure against idiosyncratic shocks, but 
spreads the cost of financing government expenditure over more taxpayers. We therefore 
expect a negative effect of population on fiscal policy volatility. Finally, income inequality is 
included in regression to take into account the potential effect of polarization on fiscal policy. 
As shown by Woo (2011), a high degree of polarization may lead to more volatility. Data 
related to growth, inflation, trade openness and population are drawn from the World 
                                                          
5
 Note that the results qualitatively remain unchanged when we control for the volatility of oil rent which might 
be a potential source of fiscal volatility in resource rich countries. The main drawback is that the inclusion of this 
variable may reduce the explanatory power of inflation which intended to capture price shocks of various 
sources.  
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Development Indicator of the World Bank. Data on financial openness are from Ito and Chinn 
(2013). The income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient of gross income obtained 
from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). 
Concerning the institutional controls, we use a measure of democracy, major government 
crises, check and balances, size of the cabinet, opposition fractionalization and Government 
fractionalization. As a measure of democracy, we use the variable Polity2 from the Polity IV 
project. This variable ranges between -10 (strongly autocratic) and +10 (strongly democratic) 
and measures the extent to which a country is democratic. Democracy supposes more control 
on the executive and prevents the ruler to use excessive public spending in order to remain in 
power. The level of democracy should therefore be negatively correlated with fiscal policy 
volatility. Data on major government crises captures any rapidly developing situation 
(excluding revolts) that threatens to bring the downfall of the current regime. Likewise the 
size of the cabinet refers to the number of “cabinet rank” at the end of the year.  These data 
are provided by the Cross National Time-Series Data Archives (CNTS). Government crisis is 
more likely to generate political instability. We then expect a positive relationship with fiscal 
policy volatility. In the same time increased size of the cabinet leads to excessive expenditure 
and more volatility. The check and balances captures the extent to which the action of the 
executive can be controlled. This measure is provided by the Database of Political Institutions 
(DPI) of the World Bank. The effect of check and balances on fiscal policy volatility is 
controversial. According to Fatas and Mihov (2003) political constraints have a negative and 
significant impact on the volatility. However, using a full set of controls, Agnello et al (2014) 
find a positive but not significant effect. The fractionalization measures the probability that 
two deputies picked at random from the legislature/opposition will be of different parties. We 
expect a positive relationship with fiscal volatility because more fractionalization induces 
greater infighting between various political groups (Acemoglu et al, 2003).  
In equation (2), we are interested in identifying the coefficient  , the effect of terrorism on 
fiscal policy volatility. We test the hypothesis that terrorism positively affects fiscal volatility 
in developing countries. In fact, an intensification of terrorist attacks induces a rise in public 
spending allocated to domestic security. This also drives the spending away from investment 
and reduces the tax base. Likewise terrorist incidents lead to higher uncertainty which affect 
the business climate and push the entrepreneurs to invest in activities from which they can 
easily and quickly withdraw their capital (Acemoglu et al, 2003). The descriptive statistics 
related to the control variables are presented in Table 1. 
3.3. Identification strategy 
The simplest strategy to estimate the effect of terrorism on fiscal volatility is to use ordinary 
least square regression. However, this approach may raise three distinctive issues. Although 
terrorist incidents are less predictable, they are deeply rooted in economic and social 
deprivation. Therefore, terrorism can be considered as endogenous. Thus, by using ordinary 
least squared, we may be capturing reverse causality or the effect of some omitted 
characteristics that are correlated with terrorism. In addition terrorist incidents may be 
measured with error. In this context, OLS estimates will be biased and the effect of terrorism 
on fiscal volatility will not be interpreted as causal. 
In this research, our strategy is to instrument terrorism building on the existing literature on 
the determinants of conflicts. We argue that terrorism is more likely to occur in countries 
characterized by scarcity of economic resources due to long lasting economic shocks and 
higher initial level of conflict. Specifically, we build our instrument of terrorist incidents by 
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multiplying the initial level of terrorism in a specific country by the variation in rainfall. The 
formula used is the following: 
                                                                                                                            (3) 
In this equation,        is the exogenous determinant of terrorism,       is the initial 
level of terrorism, the number of terrorist incidents at the beginning of the sample period, 
       measures rainfall shock and is calculated as the five years rolling standard deviation of 
rainfall.  
There is an increasing body of the literature highlighting the effect of economic 
condition on the likelihood of conflict. In a well know paper, Miguel and al (2004) shows that 
negative growth shocks increase the likelihood of conflict and that this effect remains 
unchanged whether we consider a more democratic, richer or more ethnically diverse country. 
They also show that variation in rainfall can be considered as a source of exogenous variation 
of income growth. Recently Hsiang, Burke and Miguel (2014), drawing from various 
disciplines including economics, political science, geography and archeology, find a strong 
causal evidence of climate events on human conflicts. This effect holds for all major regions 
in the world and across time. We build upon these evidences to argue that variation in rainfall 
is a potential exogenous source of variation in the incidents of terrorism. However, this effect 
is more likely to be amplified by the initial level of terrorism. In fact, higher initial level of 
terrorism may reveal the inability of society to solve issues such as conflict of ideas, land 
conflict or address political complaints peacefully (OECD, 2013). In addition, prolonged 
unresolved conflicts provide a fertile ground to the spread of terrorism (Fink and Barakat, 
2013; Kis-Katos et al, 2011). Using a sample of 159 countries over the period 1970-2007, 
Kis-Katos et al ( 2011) clearly show that terrorism increases with experiences of domestic 
conflict. Likewise, Drakos and Konstantinou (2013) provides evidence that terrorism risk is 
positively influenced by past terrorism risk. Moreover they find that public spending is 
ineffective in reducing observed level of terrorism. This reasoning suggests that rainfall shock 
weighted by the initial level of conflict is an instrument for the current incidence of terrorism. 
The use of initial values of variables as instrument also follows the suggestion of De la Croix 
and Doepke (2003), Bloomberg et al (2004). The reasoning underlying this instrumentation 
approach is that economic shocks as measured by the variation in rainfall increase the 
likelihood of terrorist attacks in the context where the culture of violence is deeply rooted
6
. 
Specifically, extreme variability in rainfall may exacerbate conflict over economic resources. 
In the context where the culture of violence is widespread, these conflicts are not solved 
through peaceful means and translate into terrorism. Figure 2 displays the first stage 
relationship between our instrument and the number of terrorist incidents on the whole sample 
period. 
The figure shows a strong positive relationship between our instrument and the number of 
terrorist incidents. This suggests that rainfall is clearly a useful source of variation for 
identifying the causal effect of terrorism on fiscal volatility. 
  
                                                          
6
 Note that here we use the initial level of terrorism as a proxy of the culture of violence. 
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Figure 2: Average number of terrorist incidents versus the rainfall weighted by initial 
terrorism 
 
A major concern in this type of exercise relates to the validity of exclusion restriction. A 
potential violation of the exclusion restriction may arise if rainfall instrument affects fiscal 
volatility through channels other than terrorism. We do not think that this is the case. In fact, 
the exogeneity of the instrument is intuitively plausible because there is no reason to believe 
that fiscal volatility drives the variability in rainfall. In addition, the current state of fiscal 
volatility is less likely to affect the initial level of terrorism. In this sense, our instrumental 
approach helps to rule out the issue of reverse causality. Nevertheless, the variability in 
rainfall can affect fiscal policy volatility through its effect on other determinants of conflict 
including GDP growth and inequality. To substantiate the validity of our identification 
strategy, we control for the volatility of growth and for inequality in the econometric model. 
We also show that the results are robust to the introduction of regional dummies that permit to 
take into account spillover effects and common regional effect. Besides, to address the issue 
of measurement bias which is also a potential source of endogeneity, we use 40-years average 
data in cross-country analysis and five-year non overlapping mean in the panel data analysis 
We follow in this line Woo (2011) and Agnello and Souza (2014). In addition to the use of an 
instrument, we control for a full set of macroeconomic and institutional variables in order to 
avoid the omitted variable bias. In addition, we use the Fuller’s modified Limited Information 
Maximum Likelihood (LIML) which is more robust to weak instrument (Stock and Yogo, 
2004; Davidson and Mackinnon, 2006a). 
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Empirical findings 
This section presents the results from the empirical investigation of the effect of terrorism on 
fiscal policy volatility. Section 4.1 takes a first look at the data to understand the behavior of 
fiscal volatility before and after a major episode of terrorism on the one hand. On the other 
hand, we compare the volatility between countries with higher terrorist incidents and 
countries with lower terrorist incidents. Section 4.2 discusses the results of the cross-country 
analysis while the results of the panel data are described in section 4.3. In section 4.4, we 
check the robustness of the results. 
4.1. Terrorism and fiscal volatility: naïve evidence 
The first step of our investigation consists of comparing the magnitude of the volatility before 
and after a major episode of terrorist attack. We define a major episode of terrorist attack as 
the maximum number of terrorist incidents faced by a country over the sample period. We 
drop from the sample
7
 countries whose highest number of terrorist incidents occurs at the 
beginning of the sample period. The reasoning underlying this test is that fiscal policy 
responds to the change in the frequency of terrorist attacks. Therefore, we expect that on 
average the volatility of fiscal policy will be greater after a major terrorist incident.  
Figure 3 present the level of volatility before and after a peak year of terrorist attacks.  
Figure 3: Volatility of fiscal policy, before and after major episode of terrorist incident 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
                                                          
7
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Figure 4: Volatility of fiscal policy, most affected versus less affected 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The figure shows that after a peak year of terrorist attacks, the volatility of fiscal policy is 
more than twice as the corresponding level observed prior the attack. In the same manner, 
split the sample around the median of the distribution and compare the volatility above and 
below the median. On average countries above the median experiences 14 terrorist incidents. 
This is almost fourteen times the number of terrorist attacks faces by countries that are below 
the median. Figure 4 presents the result.     
Figure 4 shows that on average, the volatility of public spending is higher for countries above 
the median of the distribution. 
Overall this first look at the data suggests that fiscal policy volatility is positively correlated 
with terrorism in developing countries. 
4.2. Cross-country analysis 
We start by quantifying the relationship between fiscal volatility and terrorism in a cross-
country setting which will serve as a benchmark. Since, we are primarily interested in the long 
run effect of terrorism on fiscal volatility, the cross country regression will be appropriate as a 
starting point. In order to carry out this analysis, data are averaged over the sample period.  
Table 2 reports the OLS estimates as well as instrumental variable estimates. Columns (1) to 
(3) present the results based on the OLS estimator. We check various specifications to ensure 
the robustness of the results. All the specifications are controlled for regional effects and the 
standard errors of the coefficients are corrected using the standard Huber-White procedure. In 
addition, in order to ensure that the results are not driven by outliers, we implement the high 
breakdown MM-estimator of Yohai (1987).  The estimates reported in columns (2) to (3) 
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show that the coefficients associated with terrorism are all positive and significant at the 10% 
level. The results also provide a support to the importance of macroeconomic factors in 
explaining fiscal volatility. Specifically, GDP growth instability, Inflation instability and trade 
openness enter regression in both positive and significant coefficients. Among the 
institutional variables, only the variable which measures the major government crisis has the 
expected positive sign. The instrumental variable estimates are presented in column (4) to (6). 
In all the three specifications, the effect of terrorism is positive and significant at the 5% level. 
Specifically a one percent increase in the number of terrorist incidents leads to a rise of 
volatility ranging between 0.19% and 0.21%. Taking the highest estimate, a one standard 
deviation increase in terrorist attacks induces a rise of 0.18 standard deviation in fiscal 
volatility. As it can be seen, the magnitude of the IV estimate is slightly higher than the one 
observed in the OLS. This reflects the fact that taking the average of data reduces the 
attenuation bias induced by the measurement error. Considering the validity of our 
instrumentation strategy, the first stage regression suggests that our instrument is not weak. 
The coefficient of the instrument is significant at 1% level and the Fisher test of the weak 
identification is higher than the critical values of the size of bias as computed by Stock and 
Yogo (2005).  
As previously discussed, it is possible that our instrument doesn’t perfectly satisfy the 
exclusion restriction. Even in this case, our instrumentation strategy remains valid. In fact as 
shown by Anderson and Rubin (1949), Moreira and Poi (2003), Berkowitz, Caner and Fang 
(2012), we can still draw a valid inference when the exclusion restriction is not fully satisfied. 
In this vein, we first provide the Anderson and Rubin (1949) confidence interval which is 
robust to weak instrument. This permits to draw a valid inference independently of the 
strength of instrument and define a set of values of parameter for which the null hypothesis of 
“no effect” of the endogenous variable can be rejected. The Anderson and Rubin (AR) 
confidence intervals are presented at the bottom of Table 2 and show that the coefficients of 
terrorism lie within the AR interval. However as pointed out by Berkowitz, Caner and Fang 
(2012), the AR test rely on a strong assumption that the instrument is perfectly exogenous and 
therefore may have bad small sample property. Therefore to substantiate our identification 
strategy, we also report the fractionally resampled AR test. The fractionally resampled AR 
test proposed by Berkowitz, Caner and Fang (2012), permit to draw a valid inference while 
allowing the instrument to be weakly correlated with the residuals of the structural equation. 
The results show that the hypothesis of a significant positive effect of terrorism on fiscal 
policy cannot be rejected at the 10% level.  
Turning to the other controls included in the regression, both growth and inflation exhibit the 
expected positive sign. This confirms the findings of the recent paper of Cevik and Teksoz 
(2014). However, the results do not support the hypothesis of a significant effect of 
institutional variables. 
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Table 2: Terrorism and fiscal policy volatility, cross-country evidence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
OLS 2SLS 
Dependent Variable: Log(fiscal instability) Log(fiscal instability) 
Log(number of terrorist attacks) 0.112 0.132* 0.129* 0.192** 0.213** 0.218** 
 
(0.0683) (0.0745) (0.0706) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) 
Log(GDP growth instability) 0.0583** 0.0556** 0.0530** 0.041* 0.038 0.040* 
 
(0.0264) (0.0254) (0.0247) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
Log(inflation instability) 0.291*** 0.308*** 0.302*** 0.308*** 0.327*** 0.330*** 
 
(0.0592) (0.0529) (0.0566) (0.055) (0.053) (0.054) 
Trade openness 0.00462* 0.00518* 0.00540* 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.00269) (0.00295) (0.00297) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Financial openness -0.239 -0.255 -0.296 0.217 0.210 0.221 
 
(0.327) (0.318) (0.317) (0.416) (0.405) (0.411) 
Log(population) -0.0722 -0.0876 -0.0859 -0.132** -0.144*** -0.146*** 
 
(0.0582) (0.0588) (0.0593) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) 
Democracy -0.0245 -0.0234 -0.0209 -0.029* -0.026 -0.028 
 
(0.0223) (0.0220) (0.0210) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Major government crisis 0.545** 0.521** 0.555*** 0.394** 0.362* 0.339 
 
(0.232) (0.202) (0.209) (0.192) (0.185) (0.212) 
Checks and balances 0.0680 0.0445 0.0408 0.104** 0.073 0.079 
 
(0.0666) (0.0671) (0.0585) (0.052) (0.058) (0.061) 
Size of the cabinet 0.00711 0.00744 0.00840 0.013 0.015 0.014 
 
(0.0114) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Opposition fractionalization 
 
0.236 0.232  
0.285 0.273 
  
(0.423) (0.357)  
(0.281) (0.283) 
Government fractionalization 
 
0.194 0.221  
0.109 0.120 
  
(0.322) (0.374)  
(0.294) (0.320) 
Income inequality 
  
-0.00662   
0.004 
   
(0.0100)   
(0.010) 
Intercept -3.221*** -3.218*** -2.977*** -2.881*** -2.918*** -3.028*** 
 
(0.665) (0.658) (0.712) (0.559) (0.552) (0.610) 
Continent fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage 
      
Log(rainfall weighted by initial terrorism) 
   
0.079*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 
    
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Observations 66 66 65 66 66 65 
R squared 0.454 0.455 0.456  0.55  0.55  0.55 
F-stat for weak identification       21.354 20.947 22.213 
AR-Confidence interval 
   
[-.01, .48] [ .01,  .51] [ .02, .50]  
Fractionally resampled AR-test-Pvalues       0.10 0.10 0.10 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In order to refine the interpretation of the main findings, Figure 5 displays the marginal effect 
of terrorist attacks with 95% confidence interval. We allow the number of terrorist incidents 
to vary from 0 (no attack) to the maximum while the other variables in the model are set at the 
mean. The figure shows that everything held constant, going from no attack to the maximum 
increases the marginal effect of terrorism by 92%.  
Figure 5: Marginal effect of terrorist attacks, cross-country analysis 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Likewise, we set the value of the number of terrorist incidents at the mean of the distribution 
and assess how the marginal effect changes across regions. Figure 6 shows that South Asia is 
the region whose volatility of fiscal policy responds less to the rise in terrorist incidents. 
Conversely, Sub-Saharan Africa is the region where the volatility of fiscal policy is very 
responsive to terrorism. The difference in the responsiveness is huge as it stands at 300%.  
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Figure 6: Marginal effect of terrorist attacks over regions, cross-country analysis 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
4.3. Panel data analysis 
Although the main purpose of this research is to carry-out a cross-country comparison of the 
response of fiscal policy to terrorist attacks, the cross-section regressions may capturing only 
the long run effect of terrorism. We therefore reexamine the evidence presented in Table 2 
using panel regression. 
Table 3 presents the OLS estimates of the effect of terrorism on fiscal policy volatility. Data 
are averaged over five non-overlapping years to reduce annual fluctuation and measurement 
error. This reduces the time dimension to seven non overlapping periods. In the first three 
columns, in addition to the traditional controls, we add region fixed effects and time effects. 
The results are similar to the ones obtained using cross-country regressions. The terrorism 
increases the volatility of fiscal policy by a magnitude ranging between 0.11% and 0.15%. 
The main macroeconomic controls are also significant with the expected sign. In contrast with 
the cross country analysis, the main institutional variables are significant at the 5% level. 
When fixed effects are introduced in the model, the effect of terrorism drops by more than 
half, implying that a one percent increase in terrorist attacks raises the volatility of 6%.  While 
the use of panel data helps reduce the omitted variable bias, it can increase the measurement 
error bias, especially in the fixed effect setting (Bound et al., 2001; Griliches and Hausman, 1986).  
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Table 3: Terrorism and the volatility of fiscal policy, OLS-Fixed Effect 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 
OLS OLS 
Dependent variable Log(fiscal instability) Log(fiscal instability) 
Log(number of terrorist attacks) 0.113*** 0.150*** 0.136*** 0.0452 0.0709** 0.0661* 
 
(0.0439) (0.0432) (0.0438) (0.0355) (0.0335) (0.0346) 
Log(GDP growth instability) 0.0361** 0.0307** 0.0480** 0.0398*** 0.0353*** 0.0516*** 
 
(0.0149) (0.0156) (0.0194) (0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0162) 
Log(inflation instability) 0.407*** 0.419*** 0.442*** 0.408*** 0.422*** 0.441*** 
 
(0.0817) (0.0754) (0.0850) (0.0770) (0.0719) (0.0774) 
Trade openness 0.00379** 0.00419** 0.00400** 0.00366*** 0.00377*** 0.00354*** 
 
(0.00182) (0.00166) (0.00187) (0.00138) (0.00125) (0.00130) 
Financial openness -0.137 -0.127 -0.0320 -0.127 -0.135 -0.0201 
 
(0.202) (0.195) (0.217) (0.168) (0.163) (0.168) 
Log(population) -0.0582* -0.0936*** -0.0752** -0.0696* -0.100*** -0.0804** 
 
(0.0347) (0.0316) (0.0298) (0.0368) (0.0349) (0.0348) 
Democracy -0.0222** -0.0245*** -0.0224** -0.0278*** -0.0270*** -0.0274*** 
 
(0.00960) (0.00875) (0.0101) (0.00806) (0.00744) (0.00912) 
Major government crisis 0.0193 0.00332 -0.000409 -0.0807** -0.0804** -0.0893* 
 
(0.0906) (0.0858) (0.100) (0.0378) (0.0383) (0.0481) 
Checks and balances 0.0662** 0.0302 0.0316* 0.0630*** 0.0388** 0.0421*** 
 
(0.0262) (0.0205) (0.0189) (0.0216) (0.0184) (0.0159) 
Size of the cabinet -0.00279 -0.00292 -0.00155 -0.00538 -0.00582 -0.000650 
 
(0.00542) (0.00516) (0.00497) (0.00648) (0.00632) (0.00662) 
Opposition fractionalization 
 
0.358** 0.309 
 
0.322*** 0.287** 
  
(0.151) (0.197) 
 
(0.0947) (0.134) 
Government fractionalization 
 
0.499** 0.424** 
 
0.457*** 0.375** 
  
(0.196) (0.212) 
 
(0.147) (0.147) 
Income inequality 
  
0.00173 
  
0.00929 
   
(0.0105) 
  
(0.00802) 
Intercept -2.984*** -2.862*** -3.229*** -2.750*** -2.642*** -3.446*** 
 
(0.538) (0.476) (0.777) (0.380) (0.338) (0.725) 
Continent fixed effect Yes Yes Yes       
Country fixed effect 
   
Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 296 296 261 296 296 261 
R-squared 0.526 0.554 0.559 0.505 0.532 0.541 
Number of groups 66 66 65 66 66 65 
Number of years 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standar18 d errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4 reports the estimates of the instrumental variable regression. Columns (1) to (3) 
present the results with region and time effects. According to these estimates, a one percent 
increase in the number of terrorist attacks leads to 0.33% rise of fiscal volatility. In other 
words, doubling the number of terrorist attacks will increase the volatility of fiscal policy by 
33%. In the next three columns we add country fixed effects in the model. As observed in the 
OLS case, the magnitude of the coefficients of terrorism drops by more than 50%. This may 
be an insight that specific country characteristics explain an important part of the observed 
variability of fiscal policy. Concerning the validity of our identification strategy, the first 
stage regression suggests that our instrument is not weak. Moreover the estimated coefficients 
lie within the AR confidence interval, suggesting that we can draw valid inference from the 
model. In addition, we report the fractionally resampled AR test of Berkowitz, Caner and 
Fang (2012). The test rejects the null hypothesis at the 10% level. In other word with 90% 
confidence we cannot reject the hypothesis that terrorism significantly affects fiscal volatility. 
This inference remains valid even if the exclusion restriction is not perfectly satisfied. 
Table 4 also shows that the main macroeconomic controls enter in regression with the positive 
expected sign and most of them are significant at the 1% level. Specifically, the fiscal 
volatility is positively correlated with growth instability, inflation and trade openness while it 
is negatively affected by the size of the population. The observed negative effect of 
population confirms the findings of Agnello and Souza (2014) and suggests that smaller 
countries face more volatility due to their wider exposure to idiosyncratic shocks. Likewise, 
our results are in line with the ones of Cevik and Teksoz (2014) showing that the GDP growth 
volatility has a positive and significant effect on fiscal volatility. However, contrary to ours 
results, they did not find a significant effect of the volatility of consumer price inflation. Two 
main reasons may explain this difference in the results. First, their paper focuses on emerging 
and developed countries while our focus is on developing countries. Second they control for 
the volatility of natural resource rent which can sometimes translate into inflation. A regard 
with the institutional variables, an increase in the level of democracy reduce the volatility of 
fiscal policy by 3%. This result is consistent with the previous empirical literature (See 
Acemoglu et al, 2003; Agnello et Souza, 2014). In the same time, the higher the 
fractionalization within the government and within the opposition, the higher the volatility of 
fiscal policy. Our results don’t support the hypothesis of a positive effect of income inequality 
on fiscal policy volatility. This contrasts with the finding of Woo (2011).  
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Table 4: Terrorism and the volatility of fiscal policy, Instrumental variables estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
  Log(fiscal instability) Log(fiscal instability) 
Log(number of terrorist attacks) 0.283** 0.341*** 0.331*** 0.126** 0.205*** 0.259** 
 
(0.111) (0.117) (0.120) (0.0538) (0.0770) (0.109) 
Log(GDP growth instability) 0.037* 0.029 0.050* 0.0452*** 0.0407*** 0.0630*** 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.0143) (0.0138) (0.0193) 
Log(inflation instability) 0.464*** 0.482*** 0.501*** 0.449*** 0.470*** 0.488*** 
 
(0.087) (0.080) (0.089) (0.101) (0.0922) (0.0959) 
Trade openness 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.00488** 0.00521** 0.00535** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.00227) (0.00223) (0.00235) 
Financial openness -0.096 -0.044 0.082 -0.178 -0.156 -0.0117 
 
(0.172) (0.167) (0.180) (0.154) (0.156) (0.166) 
Log(population) -0.070* -0.115** -0.091* -0.0653 -0.113*** -0.108** 
 
(0.041) (0.046) (0.050) (0.0482) (0.0416) (0.0441) 
Democracy -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.025** -0.0335*** -0.0337*** -0.0336*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.00801) (0.00844) (0.0106) 
Major government crisis -0.087 -0.102 -0.097 -0.177** -0.199** -0.230* 
 
(0.125) (0.130) (0.135) (0.0691) (0.0843) (0.120) 
Checks and balances 0.061** 0.022 0.017 0.0595*** 0.0307* 0.0256* 
 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.0186) (0.0164) (0.0142) 
Size of the cabinet -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.0118 -0.0122 -0.00569 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.00791) (0.00825) (0.00908) 
Opposition fractionalization  
0.473*** 0.442** 
 
0.421** 0.433* 
 
 
(0.175) (0.188) 
 
(0.169) (0.258) 
Government fractionalization  
0.581*** 0.473** 
 
0.490*** 0.356*** 
 
 
(0.206) (0.229) 
 
(0.141) (0.137) 
Income inequality   
0.001 
  
0.0112 
 
  
(0.008) 
  
(0.00823) 
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Intercept -2.950*** -2.839*** -3.362*** -3.001*** -2.785*** -3.501*** 
  (0.490) (0.453) (0.581) (0.571) (0.485) (0.801) 
Continent fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
   Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects 
   
Yes Yes Yes 
First stage       
   
Log(rainfall weighted by initial terrorism), t-1 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Observations 257 257 230 257 257 230 
No of countries 66 66 65 66 66 65 
R squared 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.53 0.55 0.56 
F-stat for weak identification. 41.877 39.607 36.304 288.21 168.93 90.90 
AR-Confidence interval [ 0.08, .57]  [ 0.13, .65]  [ 0.11, .65] [-0.17, .42] [-0.17, .38] [-0.17, .34] 
Fractionally resampled AR-test-Pvalues  0.06 0.06 0.08  0.07 0.08  0.07 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Two surprising results emerge from Table 4. First, the coefficient of the check and balances 
does not have the expected sign. The reported effect is positive and significant, especially in 
the fixed effect model. This contrasts with previous evidences suggesting that more control on 
the ruler is associated with lower fiscal policy volatility. A potential explanation of this result 
is that in the context where both the government and the opposition are made up of political 
parties coming from different background, the higher  their power on the executive the higher  
the difficulty to reach an agreement on the conduct of the fiscal policy. This obviously leads 
to more fiscal policy volatility. Our findings also suggest that once the model is controlled for 
fixed effect, the number of major economic crises reduce fiscal volatility. A possible 
interpretation of this result is that when both the government and the opposition are divided 
on the way of conducting fiscal policy, major crises allow returning to a more orthodox fiscal 
policy. 
In order to have a better understanding of the main findings of the panel data regression, 
figure 7 shows the marginal effect of terrorist attacks over the entire sample period.  
Figure 7: Marginal effect of terrorist attacks, panel data analysis 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
As in cross-country analysis, we allow the number of terrorist incidents to vary from the 
minimum value to the maximum while keeping the other controls at the mean. The figure 
shows that fiscal volatility indeed increases with the number of incident attacks. However, the 
magnitude is higher than what is observed in cross country regressions. Over the entire 
period, the increase amounts to 218% of the initial level of volatility. In the same time, the 
effect of terrorism seems to decrease over the time. The speed of the decrease is lower at the 
upper level of the distribution of terrorist attacks. For countries at the lower level of the 
distribution, the effect of terrorism drops by 6.51% while the corresponding fall is 4.63% at 
the upper level of the distribution, implying that the most affected countries take much time to 
recover. 
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We run a similar exercise while analyzing the variation of the responses across regions. 
Figure 8 presents the results. The figure shows that South Asia is the less responsive region 
while Sub-Saharan Africa is the most responsive one. This result is consistent with the 
findings of the cross-country analysis and confirms the findings of previous studies on the 
high vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Figure 8: Marginal effect of terrorist attacks over regions, panel data analysis 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
4.4. Robustness check 
We propose three tests in order to check the robustness of our findings. First, we use 
the generated instrument approach proposed by Lewbel (2012) to improve the identification 
of the effect of terrorism on fiscal policy volatility. The method of Lewbel (2012) serves to 
identify structural parameters in models with endogenous regressors in the absence of external 
instrument. The method may also be applied to supplement external instrument to improve the 
efficiency of the IV estimator. This is particularly of interest because it allows performing the 
Hansen test of orthogonality restriction which cannot be performed in the case of exact 
identification. In the Lewbel’s framework, the identification is achieved using heteroskedastic 
covariance restriction. In a single equation, generated instruments are constructed from the 
first stage regression equation, by multiplying the residuals by each of the included exogenous 
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variables in mean-centered form. The results of this regression are presented in Table 5. In the 
first two columns of this table, we replicate the standard results of the IV estimates while 
controlling for the number of casualties per terrorist attack. The main reasoning underlying 
this specification is that a country may undergo a single terrorist attack, but a huge number of 
casualties. Therefore falling to control for this variable may lead to biased estimates. In fact 
one may expect that the government is more responsive when the number of casualties is 
higher. In this case, our finding may capture not the genuine effect of increased incidents of 
terrorism, but the emotional effect generated by casualties. This is not the case as the 
estimates reported in Table 5 remains qualitatively stable and very close to that of the baseline 
model. The two remaining columns of Table 5 provide the results obtained using the method 
of Lewbel (2012). The estimates are qualitatively unchanged although the magnitude of the 
effect is smaller than what is obtained from the baseline model. A lower estimate suggests an 
increase of 0.15% of fiscal volatility for a one percent increase in the number of terrorist 
incidents. In addition, the P-value of the Hansen J test is 0.27 and suggests that the resulting 
model is over identified.  
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Table 5: Terrorism and fiscal volatility, Robustness check1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable : Log(fiscal instability) Instrumental Variable Generated instrument approach 
Log(number of terrorist attacks) 0.33157*** 0.213** 0.167* 0.151** 
 
(0.12003) (0.102) (0.0967) (0.0769) 
Log(GDP growth instability) 0.05005* 0.0620*** 0.0381 0.0500* 
 
(0.02655) (0.0189) (0.0260) (0.0284) 
Log(inflation instability) 0.50149*** 0.476*** 0.323*** 0.489*** 
 
(0.08863) (0.0949) (0.0645) (0.0917) 
Trade openness 0.00620*** 0.00536** 0.00221 0.00505* 
 
(0.00210) (0.00228) (0.00229) (0.00260) 
Financial openness 0.08977 0.00896 0.253 0.0231 
 
(0.18214) (0.169) (0.317) (0.187) 
Log(population) -0.09052* -0.100** -0.132** -0.0589 
 
(0.04974) (0.0438) (0.0590) (0.0487) 
Democracy -0.02448** -0.0279*** -0.0302* -0.0244** 
 
(0.01025) (0.0101) (0.0177) (0.0113) 
Major government crisis -0.09873 -0.193* 0.388 -0.0505 
 
(0.13579) (0.103) (0.285) (0.139) 
Checks and balances 0.01744 0.0223* 0.0909 0.0342 
 
(0.02749) (0.0133) (0.0709) (0.0239) 
Size of the cabinet -0.00861 -0.00265 0.0156 -0.00831 
 
(0.00803) (0.00872) (0.0157) (0.00796) 
Opposition fractionalization 0.44513** 0.415* 0.261 0.358* 
 
(0.18810) (0.244) (0.273) (0.202) 
Government fractionalization 0.46840** 0.382*** 0.0674 0.420 
 
(0.22997) (0.141) (0.349) (0.260) 
Income inequality 0.00065 0.00938 0.00578 0.00280 
 
(0.00828) (0.00808) (0.00851) (0.00915) 
Number of casualties -0.00018 4.12e-05 -0.00218 -0.000213 
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(0.00016) (9.19e-05) (0.00156) (0.000142) 
Intercept -3.37860*** -3.531*** -3.260*** -3.441*** 
  (0.58455) (0.840) (0.713) (0.729) 
Continent fixed effect Yes   Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes     Yes 
Country fixed effects 
 
Yes 
  First stage         
Log(rainfall weighted by initial terrorism), t-1 0.05988*** 0.060160***   
 
(0.00996) (0.00531)     
Observations 230 238 65 230 
No of countries 65 65 65 65 
R squared 0.57 0.61 0.570 0.598 
F-stat for weak ident. 36.15577 128 7.613 22.19 
Hansen test-Pvalue     0.406 0.276 
Fractionally resampled AR-test-Pvalues  0.07 0.08     
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The second approach used to test the robustness of our findings is the general method 
of moment (GMM) in a dynamic panel data setting. This approach allows addressing the issue 
of the endogeneity of the main explanatory variable (terrorism) as well as the potential 
endogeneity of some covariates. We use the two-step system GMM with Windmeijer’s(2005) 
correction of standard errors. In this setting equations in level and equations in differences are 
combined in a system where lagged variables in difference are used as instruments of the 
current variable in level. In the same time, lagged variables in level are used to instrument 
current variables in difference.  The Hansen J test is performed to check the validity of the 
instruments alongside with the first and second order autocorrelation test.  
The results are reported in Table 6. Looking at the more complete specification, a one percent 
increase in the number of terrorist attacks leads to 0.37% increase in fiscal policy volatility. 
The magnitude of this effect is higher than the upper bound estimate in the baseline IV model. 
A potential explanation of this result is the fact in the dynamic GMM model we control for 
the potential endogeneity of some control variables. In fact, Acemoglu et al (2001) show that 
falling to account for the endogeneity of some controls may lead to downward bias in the 
coefficient of   (coefficient of terrorism).  
Third, we perform difference in difference treatment effect estimation. Specifically, we built 
our treatment variable by splitting the sample between most affected and less affected 
countries according to the mean of the distribution. Thus we generate a variable taking the 
value 1 for countries that record a number of terrorist incidents above the mean, and 0 
otherwise. In order to construct the variable of policy change, for each country we record the 
year corresponding to the maximum number of terrorist attacks undergo over the sample 
period. Therefore, our policy variable takes the value 1 for the years following the major 
episode of terrorist attacks. The results of the difference in difference estimates are presented 
in Table 7 and confirm the positive effect of terrorism on fiscal policy volatility. A one 
percent increase in the number of terrorist attacks induces a rise of volatility of 0.24 to 0.31 
percent. 
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Table 6: Terrorism and fiscal volatility, Robustness check-two-step GMM estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Log(Fiscal volatility) 
Log(Fiscal volatility),t-1 0.05430 -0.05217 0.07100 
 
(0.10293) (0.08356) (0.07113) 
Log(number of terrorist attacks) 0.37933* 0.64000* 0.43767** 
 
(0.22210) (0.35100) (0.17820) 
Log(GDP growth instability) 0.07178 0.07053 0.07952* 
 
(0.05071) (0.04573) (0.04733) 
Log(inflation instability) 0.45222*** 0.38047*** 0.41742*** 
 
(0.11427) (0.12330) (0.08034) 
Trade openness 0.00912* 0.01161*** 0.00610* 
 
(0.00532) (0.00408) (0.00357) 
Financial openness 0.25157 -0.02394 0.00344 
 
(0.28141) (0.38730) (0.33167) 
Log(population) 0.01239 0.09156 -0.01958 
 
(0.13200) (0.13116) (0.12362) 
Democracy -0.02702 -0.02018 -0.03732 
 
(0.02113) (0.02095) (0.02361) 
Major government crisis -0.22446 -0.37789* -0.24401 
 
(0.15283) (0.21596) (0.17224) 
Checks and balances -0.06835 -0.08992 -0.05512 
 
(0.07358) (0.08603) (0.06101) 
Size of the cabinet -0.01147 -0.02930 -0.02169 
 
(0.01652) (0.01939) (0.01682) 
Opposition fractionalization 0.56261**  
0.72137* 
 
(0.26288) 
 
(0.38708) 
Government fractionalization 0.59368*  
0.51024 
 
(0.30921) 
 
(0.46770) 
Income inequality 0.00271   
 
(0.03418) 
  
Number of victims 0.00008 -0.00006 
 
 
(0.00019) (0.00037) 
 
Intercept -4.28842* -4.51149*** -3.29265*** 
  (2.32763) (1.21748) (1.23901) 
Number of observations 218 243 243 
Number of countries 60 61 61 
Number of instruments 43 37 41 
AR test first 0.052 0.046 0.037 
AR test second 0.643 0.885 0.664 
Hansen test-Pvalue 0.864 0.797 0.697 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7: Terrorism and fiscal volatility, Robustness check-difference in difference estimates 
Dependent variable: employment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
After terrorist attack=1 -0.0465 0.0686 -0.0633 0.00718 0.0140 0.0622 0.0615 
 
(0.0605) (0.0449) (0.0669) (0.0751) (0.0750) (0.0900) (0.0901) 
Most affected country=1 -0.600*** -0.247*** 0.162 -0.450 0.429 0.313 0.304 
 
(0.110) (0.0846) (0.292) (0.327) (0.361) (1.227) (1.228) 
Difference in Difference 0.245* 0.201** 0.281*** 0.278** 0.261** 0.313** 0.314** 
  (0.138) (0.101) (0.107) (0.120) (0.119) (0.132) (0.132) 
Log(GDP growth instability) 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log(inflation instability) 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trade openness 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial openness 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log(population) 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Democracy 
  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Major government crisis 
  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Checks and balances 
   
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size of the cabinet 
   
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Opposition fractionalization 
    
Yes Yes Yes 
Government fractionalization 
    
Yes Yes Yes 
Income inequality 
     
Yes Yes 
Number of casualties 
      
Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,199 1,179 1,143 982 975 806 806 
Adjusted R squared 0.039 0.474 0.587 0.604 0.612 0.619 0.619 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8: Terrorism and fiscal volatility, Robustness check-victims of terrorist attacks 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
2SLS 
Dependent Variable: Log(fiscal instability) 
Log(number of victimes in% population),t-1 0.0921*** 0.137*** 0.139*** 
 
(0.0305) (0.0327) (0.0324) 
Log(GDP growth instability) 0.112*** 0.116*** 0.124*** 
 
(0.0234) (0.0310) (0.0326) 
Log(inflation instability) 0.389*** 0.416*** 0.415*** 
 
(0.0896) (0.0863) (0.0881) 
Trade openness 0.00373** 0.00371** 0.00370** 
 
(0.00182) (0.00170) (0.00185) 
Financial openness -0.107 0.0534 0.0689 
 
(0.120) (0.127) (0.129) 
Log(population) 0.0191 0.0659 0.0661 
 
(0.0476) (0.0477) (0.0505) 
Oil rent volatility 
  
-0.0138 
   
(0.0265) 
Democracy -0.0326*** -0.0372*** -0.0375*** 
 
(0.00731) (0.00826) (0.00908) 
Major government crisis -0.298*** -0.355*** -0.358*** 
 
(0.0770) (0.0672) (0.0677) 
Checks and balances 0.0513*** 0.0597*** 0.0597*** 
 
(0.0117) (0.00675) (0.00706) 
Size of the cabinet -0.0233*** -0.0206* -0.0200* 
 
(0.00806) (0.0111) (0.0110) 
Opposition fractionalization 0.318 0.242 0.264 
 
(0.206) (0.229) (0.236) 
Government fractionalization 0.175 0.116 0.105 
 
(0.134) (0.0991) (0.102) 
Income inequality  0.0149* 0.0150* 
 
 (0.00846) (0.00869) 
Intercept -3.277*** -4.521*** -4.555*** 
 
(0.561) (0.774) (0.856) 
Time & country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
First stage 
   
Log(rainfall weighted by initial terrorism),t-1 0. 12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 
 
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 184 169 169 
R squared 0.580 0.572 0.571 
F-stat for weak ident. 29.44 20.05 20.07 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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As an additional robustness test, we use the number of victims as an alternative measure of 
terrorist threat. Table 8 presents the results and shows that a 1% increase in the number of 
victims
8
 in percentage of total population raises the fiscal volatility by 0.13%. In the 
regressions presented above, we mainly make use of total government spending.  
However, it could be interesting to see whether consumption and investment are affected by 
terrorism in the same way. Therefore, one report disaggregated estimates by type of spending 
in Table 9. According to this table, the magnitude of the effect of terrorism on fiscal volatility 
remains unchanged no matter the type of public spending. 
 
                                                          
8
 The number of victims is computed as the sum of deaths and injured people in percentage of the total 
population. 
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Table 9: Terrorism and fiscal volatility, Robustness check-disaggregated spending 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)             (5)                     (6)  
 
2SLS 
Dependent Variable:Log(fiscal instability) Full model Consumption Investment 
Log(1+number of terrorist attacks),t-1 0.254*** 0.253*** 0.260** 0.263** 0.251** 0.250** 
 
(0.0943) (0.0918) (0.117) (0.122) (0.124) (0.124) 
Log(GDP growth instability) 0.0620*** 0.0573** 0.0626*** 0.0589*** 0.0596* 0.0586 
 
(0.0222) (0.0233) (0.0155) (0.0135) (0.0352) (0.0371) 
Log(inflation instability) 0.499*** 0.495*** 0.545*** 0.519*** 0.478*** 0.477*** 
 
(0.0863) (0.0893) (0.0872) (0.0937) (0.0880) (0.0902) 
Trade openness 0.00438** 0.00391 0.000635 0.000145 0.00437** 0.00421* 
 
(0.00222) (0.00242) (0.00168) (0.00167) (0.00199) (0.00244) 
Financial openness 0.0554 0.0276 0.350 0.327 0.0834 0.0758 
 
(0.183) (0.199) (0.229) (0.240) (0.188) (0.199) 
Log(population) -0.123*** -0.122*** -0.130** -0.138** -0.174*** -0.174*** 
 
(0.0413) (0.0414) (0.0602) (0.0611) (0.0402) (0.0403) 
Oil rent volatility -0.0225 -0.0222 -0.0217 -0.0153 -0.0532 -0.0540 
 
(0.0300) (0.0362) (0.0211) (0.0223) (0.0518) (0.0530) 
Democracy -0.0379*** -0.0372*** -0.0289*** -0.0254*** -0.0398** -0.0394** 
 
(0.0118) (0.0117) (0.00775) (0.00762) (0.0163) (0.0168) 
Major government crisis -0.252** -0.232* -0.423** -0.409** -0.205 -0.198 
 
(0.127) (0.129) (0.182) (0.170) (0.158) (0.166) 
Checks and balances 0.0427*** 0.0400*** 0.0563*** 0.0474*** 0.0678*** 0.0671** 
 
(0.0109) (0.00888) (0.0158) (0.0146) (0.0252) (0.0263) 
Size of the cabinet -0.00287 -0.00181 0.00383 0.00688 -0.00185 -0.00147 
 
(0.00762) (0.00771) (0.0106) (0.0112) (0.00868) (0.00906) 
Opposition fractionalization 0.372 0.365 0.317** 0.293* 0.290 0.291 
 
(0.241) (0.246) (0.157) (0.166) (0.264) (0.269) 
Government fractionalization 0.299** 0.304** -0.0122 0.0107 0.454*** 0.455*** 
 
(0.142) (0.142) (0.184) (0.200) (0.136) (0.135) 
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Income inequality 0.0120 0.0128 0.00860 0.00704 0.0152 0.0154* 
 
(0.00862) (0.00783) (0.00564) (0.00520) 
 
(0.00891) 
Foreign direct investment%GDP 
 
0.0160 
 
0.0331 
 
0.00457 
  
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0360) 
 
(0.0179) 
Intercept -3.801*** -3.824*** -3.312*** -3.206*** -3.111*** -3.113*** 
 
(0.854) (0.831) (0.724) (0.604) (0.935) (0.931) 
Time & country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage 
      
Log(rainfall weighted by initial terrorism),t-1 0. 06*** 0.061***  0.065***  0.064***  0.065***  0.066*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Observations 230 230 236 225 232 232 
R squared 0.577 0.579 0.563 0.513 0.526 0.526 
F-stat for weak ident. 57.20 55.30  65.15 58.82 65.15 64.24 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Conclusion 
Over the recent years, especially in the post September 11
th
 period, scholars have devoted 
much attention to the understanding of the economic cost and consequences of terrorism. 
Although there is a wide consensus on its negative effect on growth, there is little evidence 
about the key channels through which this effect occur. This paper argues that by increasing 
the uncertainty surrounding the conduct of fiscal policy, terrorism negatively affect growth. 
Therefore, we empirically document the effect of terrorism on the fiscal policy volatility in 
developing countries. Terrorism is measured by the number of terrorist incidents by year 
faced by a specific country including domestic and transnational terrorism. The fiscal policy 
volatility is captured by the standard deviation of a measure of discretionary fiscal policy 
following the seminal paper of Fatas and Mihov (2003).  
Using both cross-country and panel data analysis for a sample of 66 developing countries, 
over the period spanning from1970 to 2012, we show that terrorism increases fiscal policy 
volatility in developing countries. Specifically, a one percent increase in the number of 
terrorist incidents induces a rise in fiscal volatility ranging between 0.21% (cross country 
analysis) and 0.37% (panel data analysis). In addition, the analysis shows that fiscal volatility 
is positively influenced by the volatility of output growth, the consumer price inflation 
volatility, the degree of fractionalization of both the government and the opposition. The 
results also show that the volatility is higher is countries of small size and lower in more 
democratic countries. 
Our results are robust to reverse causality, endogeneity bias and the presence of various 
controls. Moreover, the results stand for the use of alternative identification strategy including 
system-GMM, the generated instrument approach and the difference in difference estimator. 
In addition, the findings are qualitatively unchanged when we use disaggregated spending and 
an alternative measure of terrorism. 
This paper complements and extends the previous literature by shedding a light on a new 
source of fiscal policy volatility and by providing a new economic channel to substantiate the 
negative relation between terrorism and growth. This paper shows that after controlling for 
the traditional determinants of fiscal volatility, the terrorism substantially increase the 
uncertainty surrounding the conduct of fiscal policy in developing countries. 
This paper points to more policy efforts to circumvent terrorist threat and put in place tight 
fiscal rule to ensure a sustainable and stable fiscal policy. In this line, an interesting question 
to answer is whether countries with explicit fiscal rules face less volatility of public spending. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A: List of countries 
Country 
Argentina Angola Panama Gabon Mongolia 
Ghana Albania Peru Guatemala Mozambique 
Guinea Burundi Philippines Guyana Mauritania 
Namibia Bangladesh Paraguay Honduras Malaysia 
Nicaragua Bulgaria Rwanda Indonesia Niger 
Tanzania Bolivia Senegal India Nepal 
Zambia Brazil Sierra Leone Jamaica Pakistan 
 
Botswana El Salvador Jordan 
 
 
Central African Republic Chad Kenya 
 
 
Cote d'Ivoire Togo Cambodia 
 
 
Colombia Thailand Liberia 
 
 
Costa Rica Tunisia Sri Lanka 
 
 
Dominican Republic Turkey Lesotho 
 
 
Algeria Uganda Morocco 
 
 
Ecuador Uruguay Madagascar 
 
 
Ethiopia South Africa Mexico 
   Fiji Zimbabwe Mali   
 
 
 
